In a large sample of public-public acquisitions, target valuation changes between their 52-week highs and just prior to the acquisition announcements are positively related to acquirer announcement returns. Behavioral biases based on prospect theory potentially explain this relation. Yet, the target valuation change variables are highly correlated with target valuation uncertainty proxies that also affect acquirer announcement returns. These findings suggest that rational explanations based on target valuation uncertainty are at least as relevant as behavioral stories for explaining the significant empirical relation of prior target valuation changes and acquirer announcement returns.
In a large sample of public-public acquisitions, target valuation changes between their 52-week highs and just prior to the acquisition announcements are positively related to acquirer announcement returns.
Behavioral biases based on prospect theory potentially explain this relation. Yet, the target valuation change variables are highly correlated with target valuation uncertainty proxies that also affect acquirer announcement returns. These findings suggest that rational explanations based on target valuation uncertainty are at least as relevant as behavioral stories for explaining the significant empirical relation of prior target valuation changes and acquirer announcement returns.
Introduction
Recent empirical studies show that prior target valuation changes affect acquirer announcement returns. For private targets, Cooney, Moeller, and Stegemoller (2009) find that target valuation changes between a withdrawn initial public offering (IPO) and a subsequent acquisition are positively related to acquirer announcement returns. For public targets, Baker, Pan, and Wurgler (2009) report that targets' 52-week high share prices inflate takeover offer premiums. Pre-offer target prices below their 52-week highs are associated with more negative acquirer announcement returns, presumably because the acquirers offer excessive takeover premiums. The more the offer premiums are driven by the targets' 52-week highs, the more negative is the effect of offer premiums on acquirer announcement returns. Thus, target valuation changes between a 52-week high and just prior to a subsequent acquisition offer are positively related to acquirer announcement returns.
It is not obvious why prior target valuations affect acquirer announcement returns, although the empirical findings are similar to the partial adjustment effect in initial public offerings (Hanley, 1993, Loughran and Ritter, 2002) . In fact, it is easier to argue that prior valuations should be irrelevant. In this spirit, Baker et al. (2009) attribute the effect of prior target valuation changes to irrational behavioral biases of acquirers and targets. In contrast, Cooney et al. (2009) favor a rational explanation in which target valuation changes proxy for target valuation uncertainty. This valuation uncertainty fundamentally affects the acquirer announcement returns.
Unfortunately, the sample in Cooney et al. (2009) is small and quite distinct. To generalize their results, similar tests with a larger sample of public acquisitions would be necessary.
Any test of the relevance of prior valuation changes relies on defining an anchor valuation. In Cooney et al. (2009) , the only feasible target valuation comes from the target's anticipated valuation at the time of its failed IPO. In acquisitions of public targets, choosing the anchor valuation is largely arbitrary. Fortunately, Baker et al. (2009) make a strong case that, of all prior target valuations, the 52-week high has the most empirical relevance. Part of their reasoning is based on the fact that takeover offers cluster heavily around the targets' 52-week high prices. In research with a sample of acquisitions of recent IPOs, Jindra and Moeller (2009) introduce two other choices by selecting the target's IPO price and end of first trading day price as anchors.
In this paper, I examine whether the effect of prior target valuation changes on acquirer announcement returns is driven by behavioral biases or by rational considerations. As in Baker et al. (2009) , I use a large sample of public-public acquisitions and base my main target valuation change measure on the target's 52-week high. Similar to Cooney et al. (2009) , by focusing on target valuation risk, I expand the search of explanations beyond behavioral biases.
Overall, I find strong support that valuation changes from a target's 52-week high affect acquirer announcement returns. My main measure of target valuation changes is Target Δ high, the target's share price one week prior to the acquisition announcement divided by the target's 52-week high share price (also for the period ending one week prior to the acquisition announcement) minus one. Acquirers of targets in the bottom tercile of Target Δ high have average announcement returns of -2.8% compared to -1.2% in acquisition of targets in the top tercile. Regression results further show that the farther the target price just prior to the acquisition is below its 52-week high, the more negative is the acquirer announcement return. This result is consistent with behavioral biases based on prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) . It also parallels the finding in Cooney et al. (2009) that acquirer announcement returns are positively related to target valuation changes. Yet, I also find that measures of target valuation uncertainty are strongly related to target valuation changes and that they affect acquirer announcement returns.
My main proxies for target valuation uncertainty are Target price range, the 52-week high minus the 52-week low, standardized by the mid-point of the 52-week high and low, Industry M/B stdev, the standard deviation of the market-to-book ratios of firms in the target industry with assets between half and twice the target's assets, and Target price stdev, the standard deviation of the target's share prices, measured from 370 to 15 days before the acquisition announcement.
Higher target valuation uncertainty is related to lower acquirer announcement returns. Acquirers of targets in the bottom tercile of Target price range have average announcement returns of -1.3% compared to -3.3% in acquisition of targets in the top tercile. The average acquirer announcement returns for the bottom (top) terciles of Industry M/B stdev and Target price stdev are -1.6%
(-3.1%) and -1.3% (-3.2%), respectively.
Why do investors react negatively to acquisitions of risky targets? My risk proxies measure idiosyncratic and industry-specific target valuation uncertainty. In Cooney et al. (2009) , acquirer announcement returns are positively related to target valuation risk. They explain the positive relation with risk-averse acquirer managers requiring compensation for the assumption of valuation risk in form of lower acquisition prices. Acquirer shareholders who are less risk-averse than managers focus more on the lower acquisition price than the added idiosyncratic risk (that they can largely diversify away). Since the targets in Cooney et al. (2009) are private, their owners are likely undiversified and benefit from offloading valuation risk to acquirers. Therefore, the acquirer's need for compensation for assuming valuation risk is matched by the target's willingness to provide it. Consequently, higher target valuation risk is associated with higher acquirer announcement returns in private acquisitions.
Shareholders of public targets are likely more diversified than the owners of private firms. Therefore, they have no incentive to provide compensation for offloading idiosyncratic risk.
Without compensation in the form of lower acquisition prices, acquirer managers would have to be compelled by other, likely private, benefits to undertake acquisitions of risky targets.
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Examples of these costly benefits are higher compensation from running a larger firm or a better ability to hide poor performance in a more complex firm. If the takeover market is competitive, 1 An acquisition, even of a risky target, can be attractive because of synergies. However, there is no reason why synergies and idiosyncratic risk should be correlated, and empirical evidence of synergies is sparse. the costs of the managerial benefits are borne by the acquiring firm. Therefore, the more risky the public target, the more negative is the investors' reaction.
Private targets in Cooney et al. (2009) and public targets here are likely the reason for the opposite effects of target valuation risk on acquirer announcement returns. Target valuation risk seems to affect public and private takeovers in fundamentally different ways, similar to the unconditional differences in acquirer announcement returns that are on average positive for private targets (Fuller, Netter, and Stegemoller, 2002) and negative for public targets (e.g., Moeller, 2005) .
In contrast to Cooney et al. (2009) , the target valuation change and target valuation uncertainty variables are negatively correlated in my study. The farther the target's stock price one week before the acquisition announcement is below its 52-week high, the higher is the target valuation uncertainty. This relation is intuitive because a larger absolute distance from a prior value suggests that investors are uncertain about the appropriate target valuation. Consequently, Target Δ high can be interpreted as a risk proxy. Higher valuation risk is associated with lower Target Δ high, which in turn is associated with lower acquirer announcement returns. The difference to Cooney et al. (2009) One difficulty in interpreting the empirical results is that target valuation change variables and target valuation uncertainty proxies are highly correlated. In addition, these variables have substantial correlation with acquirer and target market-to-book ratios. Absent a convincing empirical identification, only qualitative arguments can favor some explanations over others.
Considering the evidence, there is no reason to attribute the effects of target valuation changes on acquirer announcement returns solely to behavioral biases. There is significant evidence that target valuation uncertainty drives at least part of the effect. Furthermore, the target valuation uncertainty rationale seems to be more appealing than the irrational behavioral bias explanation.
Since rational and irrational explanations are not mutually exclusive, both types of theories can cause the empirical relevance of prior target valuation changes for acquirer announcement returns.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the sample and section 3 presents the empirical results. Section 4 addresses robustness issues and section 6 concludes. firms and the acquirer holds no more than 10% of the target's shares before the acquisition announcement and no less than 90% afterwards. CRSP and Compustat matches are available for targets and acquirers in 3,702 takeovers. I further require that the deal value is at least $30 million (in year 2000 dollars) and that the market value of the target's equity represents at least 1% of the acquirer's equity value (both measured at the last fiscal year-end before the acquisition announcement).
Data
2 Together with some missing data items, these requirements reduce the main sample to 2,550 observations. The average fraction of the acquisition price that is paid with acquirer stock (Stock pct) is 60.1%.
Target cash flow/ cash, the net cash flow from operating activities divided by cash and short-term investments, has a mean of 631.8% and a median of 56.5% while Target net income/ assets, the target's net income divided by its total assets, has a mean and median of -1% and 1.5%, respectively. Target runup is the return of the target from 60 calendar days before to the beginning of the announcement return window. Its mean is 10% and its median is 7.2%.
Panel B shows that the SDC Mergers & Acquisitions database classifies only 1.7% of the sample takeovers as hostile, while 14.9% involve tender offers. The acquisition is paid with at least 90% stock (Stock) in 70.8% of the observations. I describe the variable Risk index below.
Panel C shows the distribution of the sample takeovers over time. The highest activity is between 1995 and 2000, accounting for slightly more than half of the sample.
Results
I test the effect of prior target valuation changes and target valuation uncertainty proxies on acquirer announcement returns.
Univariate results
In Table 2 Acquirer size (Acquirer market value) seems to have no impact on acquirer announcement returns, but both Target market value and Relative size show that acquisitions of (relatively) larger targets are associated with significantly lower acquirer announcement returns.
Acquirer and target market-to-book ratios are significantly negatively related to Acquirer CAR and so is Stock pct. When I split the sample using the dummy variable Stock instead of the terciles based on Stock pct, the results are similar. If acquirer market-to-book is a measure of overvaluation, paying with stock can signal the overvaluation and cause the negative relations of
Acquirer M/B and Stock pct with Acquirer CAR. The significance of Target M/B can be due to
Target M/B being a proxy for overvaluation and overpaying by the acquirer, but its significance can also be spurious because acquirer and target market-to-book ratios are highly correlated. Overall, Table 2 shows that the target's price change from its 52-week high to just prior to the acquisition announcement is negatively related to acquirer announcement returns. The more the target's price declines prior to the acquisition, the lower are the acquirer announcement returns.
This result is consistent with behavioral biases based on prospect theory. If the 52-week high serves as an anchor valuation for the target, 3 target management should negotiate harder, the further the target's current price is from this anchor. A tougher negotiation stance of the target should lead to a worse deal for the acquirer, resulting in lower acquirer announcement returns.
The behavioral bias can also occur on the acquirer side. If the acquirer anchors on the target's 52-week high, the further the target's price is below that level, the better the perceived deal for the acquirer and presumably the more lax its negotiation approach.
The relations of the three target valuation uncertainty proxies and the combination measure Risk index to acquirer announcement returns are of similar magnitude and significance as the relation of Target Δ high and Acquirer CAR. These relations suggest that target valuation risk has a significantly negative effect on acquirer announcement returns. The interesting question is whether the target valuation uncertainty proxies measure essentially the same underlying effect as Target Δ high. I contend that Target Δ high can be related to both behavioral biases and target valuation risk while it is difficult to interpret the target valuation uncertainty proxies as measures related to behavioral biases. Therefore, the relation of Target Δ high and the target valuation uncertainty proxies and their joint effect on Acquirer CAR should help determine the underlying force behind the relation of target valuation changes and acquirer announcement returns.
Regression results
To confirm the univariate results in the presence of control variables, I regress Acquirer CAR separately on Target Δ high and the target valuation risk proxies. All regressions have acquisition year dummy variables (not reported in tables) and heteroskedasticity-adjusted standard errors following White (1980) and MacKinnon and White (1985) . "Log" in front of the variable name indicates the natural logarithm of the variable, or one plus the variable where needed to avoid logarithms of negative numbers. The reason for using logarithms is to reduce the impact of outliers.
In column 1 of Table 3 , Log target Δ high is positive and significant at the 0.01 level. The closer the target trades to its 52-week high one week before the acquisition announcement, the higher is the acquirer announcement return. This result is consistent with the partial adjustment effect for private targets found in Cooney et al. (2009 Faccio, McConnell, and Stolin (2006) and Asquith, Bruner, and Mullins (1983) find a positive relation between acquirer announcement returns and relative size in private and public acquisitions, respectively. The negative coefficient on Log relative size in Table 3 is inconsistent with these earlier studies. Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz (2004) find that larger acquirers earn approximately 2% lower announcement returns than do smaller acquirers. They interpret this finding as evidence of hubris (Roll, 1986) . Therefore, I include Log acquirer market value. The results are mixed with
Log acquirer market value being significantly negative in columns 1 to 3, but insignificant when Table 3 .
My goal is to determine to what extend the target valuation change from its 52-week high and the three proxies for target valuation uncertainty measure the same underlying effect on acquirer announcement returns. In Table 4 
Correlation of target valuation change and target valuation risk measures
Because the results in Table 4 suggest substantial overlap of the target valuation uncertainty measures and Log target Δ high, I examine the correlation between these variables in Table 5 . Many factors can affect target valuation changes. Therefore, I repeat the correlation analysis with control variables in a regression framework in Table 6 . I add acquisition year dummy variables to control for time effects and Target market value to address differences due to size. I also control for fundamental drivers of value with Log target cash flow/ cash and Log target net income/ assets, both of which have a significant positive effect on Log target Δ high. Target market value is generally significant, but its sign changes depending on the target valuation uncertainty proxy in the regression.
Target price range has correlations with Log industry M/B stdev and
Confirming the correlation analysis, each risk variable has a highly significant negative coefficient in columns 1 through 5 of Table 6 
Method of payment
The method of payment is an important determinant of acquirer announcement returns. In both the univariate tests and the regressions, the use of stock as payment reduces acquirer announcement returns, in particular when the acquirer's market-to-book ratio is high. These results suggest that the method of payment reveals information about the acquirer that affects acquirer announcement returns, e.g., that the acquirer management believes the acquirer is overvalued or that the acquirer does not have sufficient cash to make a cash acquisition. However, the method of payment can also be affected by the type of target. Officer et al. (2009) show that using stock is beneficial for acquirers when targets are difficult to value. Because the method of payment is likely correlated with the target valuation uncertainty that I focus on here, the regression results can be inconsistent and biased when this relation is not adequately addressed.
In Table 7 , I use a treatment model to explicitly account for the correlation of method of payment and the error term in the acquirer announcement return regressions. The treatment model uses a two-step process to address the effects of endogeneity and selection. I use the maximum likelihood approach suggested by Maddala (1983) as implemented in Stata to estimate the model.
In the first step, I estimate the probability of a stock acquisition, i.e., the likelihood that at least In column 1 of Table 7 , I add Log target Δ high. It has a significantly negative coefficient, meaning that the further the target price is below the 52-week high, the higher the probability of a stock offer. This result is consistent with Log target Δ high being a measure of target valuation uncertainty because acquirers seem to prefer stock offers when they have difficulty valuing the target. 
Robustness and alternative explanations
I examine alternative anchors for the target valuation change variable and add a target runup variable.
Alternative target valuation anchors
Column 1 of Table 8 is the same regression as column 1 of Table 3, changes have a larger affect on acquirer announcement returns after bad things happened to the target, i.e., after the target stock price declined.
Target price runup
Another potential explanation of the relation between prior target valuation changes and acquirer announcement returns is based on markup pricing (Schwert, 1996) . Under markup pricing, the target's pre-announcement runup is unrelated to post-announcement increases in the target's stock price. Therefore, the pre-announcement runup constitutes an additional cost to acquirers. This explanation implies that acquirers do not take into account targets' recent stock price runups when they determine what premium to offer. Consequently, they overpay for targets with positive price runups. Applied to my study, markup pricing implies that the acquirers' announcement returns should be lower when the targets experience higher prior valuation changes. However, I find the opposite. Regardless, I add Log target runup as a control variable.
In column 4 of Table 8 , the point estimate and significance of Log target Δ high slightly decline compared to the same regression without Log target runup in Table 3 . Log target runup is positive and significant at the 0.1 level. In columns 5 and 6, the results for Target price range and Log industry M/B stdev in the presence of Log target runup are largely identical to the estimates without the target runup variable in Table 3 . Surprisingly, Log target runup has a significantly positive coefficient. I conclude that the target runup effect differs from my results for target valuation changes and target valuation risk.
Conclusions
Using a broad sample of public-public acquisitions, I explore why prior target valuation changes affect acquirer announcement returns. This initially surprising phenomenon that also occurs in IPOs, the so called partial adjustment effect, is frequently attributed to behavioral biases of managers or investors. However, similar to Cooney et al. (2009) Table 7 Regression results for acquirer announcement returns with treatment model Stock is the dependent variable in the first step and Log acquirer CAR is the dependent variable in the second step. The second step regressions include acquisition year dummy variables. "Log" in front of the variable name indicates the natural logarithm of the variable, or of one plus the variable where needed. The correlation between Stock and the error in the acquirer announcement return regression is measured by ρ. The Wald test of ρ being equal to zero is rejected in all columns. All variables are defined in prior tables. p-Values, based on heteroskedasticity-adjusted standard errors, are in brackets. Log target runup 0.0195* 0.0304*** 0.0315***
